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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TODAY:
THE NEW IMPROVED IMPROVEMENTS ACT
By LESLIE TYLER* AND ALLEN R. ERICKSON**
I. Background to the Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission is a federal agency created to
oversee the protection of both consumers and businesses. The F.T.C.
administers a broad range of legislative programs in an attempt to
effectuate its goals. Among the statutes administered or enforced by
the F.T.C. are the Clayton Act,' as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act,2 which attempts to protect general business
competition through control of unfair restraints of trade and monopo-
lies; such narrowly applied acts as the Flammable Fabrics Act,' the
Wool Products Labeling Act,4 the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,6
and the Truth-in-Lending Act;6 as well as the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act,7 which establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at
protecting consumers and competitors from unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
The methods by which the F.T.C. has sought to enforce these vari-
ous programs have depended upon the specific statute in question.
Several of the F.T.C.'s customary methods of enforcement have oper-
ated through its authority to enter into informal settlements,8 give
advisory opinions,9 or issue guides,'" rules," or cease and desist
* Member, second year class.
** Member, California bar.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68i (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13,.1631-41, 1661-65 (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1970), ds amended §§ 45-58 (Supp. V, 1975)..
8. 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1976).
9. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.4 (1976).
10. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5-.6 (1976).
11. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-.12 (1976).
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orders. 2 The last three are similar procedures that all label some act
unfair or deceptive or establish a standard of conduct requiring compli-
ance. The effect of each is quite different, however. Guides are
drafted on an industry-wide basis, but do not have the force of law.'3
Cease and desist orders and rules, on the other hand, do have the force
and effect of law.14  Cease and desist orders are aimed at the conduct
of a particular party, ordering them henceforth to refrain from commit-
ting the proscribed act or practice. They have customarily been appli-
cable only to the party specifically named in the order.'" A trade regu-
lation rule has the same purpose of proscribing unfair or deceptive acts,
but rules are generally broader in their coverage than orders in terms
of the number of parties affected. A rule may be either generally
applicable or limited to particular areas, products, or industries. If an
order or rule is violated, a separate procedure is then required to enable
the agency to seek penalties for the violation, providing the statute
involved allows for the recovery of penalties.
This note will focus on the F.T.C.'s enforcement of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and specifically the Act's provisions dealing
with unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Since the creation of the
F.T.C. in 1914, Congress has made only two major revisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The first was made in 1938 under
the Wheeler-Lea Act,' which amended the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to include within the F.T.C.'s jurisdiction unfair or deceptive
acts or practices and clearly charged the commission with protecting
consumers as well as competitors. The second major revision did not
occur until 1974, when the 93rd Congress, not previously distinguished
by its concern for the consumer, enaoted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act,' 7 a powerful, almost
radical addition to existing F.T.C. legislation. On January 4, 1975, the
Improvements Act became effective. This new legislation expressly
granted broad substantive rulemaking authority to the F.T.C.,' 8 pro-
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
13. See F.T.C. v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1965).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
15. But see 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (B) (Supp. V, 1975). This section is unique
in that a cease and desist order may be applied against any person, not just the one
named in the order, providing the requirements of § 45(m)(1)(B)(1) and (2) are sat-
isfied. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
16. Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, amend-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V, 1975).
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vided severe penalties for violations of these rules'9 and for violations
of cease and desist orders issued by the commission,20 and for the first
time, allowed the F.T.C. to seek consumer redress.
21
The first part of this note will examine the language of the
Improvements Act, highlighting its more important provisions. The
second part will analyze these provisions in light of the constitutional
limitations on administrative procedure, particularly procedural due
process.
H. Highlights of the Improvements Act of 1975
While the powers granted in the Improvements Act are not
completely new, the act provides the F.T.C. with better procedural
ammunition and meaningful penalty provisions to enforce section 5(a)
of the act. Section 5(a)(1) is the heart of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and declares that "unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce" are unlawful.
A. Jurisdiction
The Improvements Act expands the jurisdiction of the F.T.C.
from those businesses which are "in commerce" to those "affecting
commerce." 22  Even a casual knowledge of the extent to which the
commerce clause 23 has been expanded into areas that affect com-
merce readily discloses that courts have found nearly any conceivable
business to have some effect on interstate commerce. 24 The practical
effect of this is that the F.T.C.'s jurisdiction will be limited only by
logistics.
B. Rulemaking
Probably one of the most important provisions of the 1975 act is
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V, 1975). See text accompanying notes 45-50
infra.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). This change is significant because
two recent Supreme Court decisions based their holdings on the distinction between acts
"in commerce" and acts "in or affecting" commerce. See United States v. American
Building Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974).
23. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8.
24. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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section 17A, concerning the rulemaking powers of the F.T.C. Al-
though rulemaking is not new -to the F.T.C., its previous use was
markedly different from its present application. Typically, agency
rules bf the 1960's dealt with minor procedural issues or trade regula-
tion of very narrow scope and minimal importance.25 In the 1970's
the F.T.C.'s rulemaking shifted to more significant areas of industry.
Nevertheless, it was not until the court of appeals decision in National
Petroleum Refiners Association v. F.T.C.26 that the F.T.C.'s power to
promulgate rules of substance rather than merely rules of procedure
was firmly established.
7
Section 17A(a) establishes the F.T.C.'s power to make substan-
tive rules and clearly broadens the scope of such rules, permitting not
only "rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive" but also rules "for the purpose of preventing such
acts or practices." '28 While the 1975 act did not create rulemaking
power, the codification of this power carries tremendous significance.
25. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 404 (1976).
26. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
27. National Petroleum involved the precise issue of whether the Federal Trade
Commission Act empowered the commission to issue substantive rules defining illegal
conduct. The case arose after the F.T.C. issued -a rule declaring that "failure to post
octane rating numbers on gasoline pumps at service stations -vas an unfair method of
competition and an unfair or deceptive act or practice." 482 F.2d at 674. 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.12(c) (1973). National Petroleum brought suit against the F.T.C. claiming that
the rule was invalid because it was beyond the F.T.C.'s statutory authority, was an un-
constitutional usurpation of congressional power, and was arbitrary and capricious. The
district court decided the case in favor of National Petroleum solely on the ground that
the F.T.C. did not have the statutory authority to issue such rules. The F.T.C. appealed
and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that the congressional language and background of the statute clearly empowered the
F.T.C. to issue substantive rules. It based this decision primarily on the plain language
of section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which states that the commission
may from time to time "make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of [the act]." The circuit court concluded that substantive rulemaking was
not inconsistent with other provisions of the act and that similar provisions in the au-
thorizing statutes of other administrative agencies have been judicially determined to en-
compass substantive rulemaking.
28. The relevant parts of section 17A state: "(1) The Commission may prescribe-
(A) interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair and decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of section 5(a) (1)
of this Act), and (B) rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of
section 5(a) (1) of this Act). Rules under this subparagraph may include requirements
prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices. (2) The Commission
shall have no authority under this Act, other than its authority under this section, to
prescribe any rule with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce (within the meaning of section 5(a) (1) of this Act). The preceding sentence
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The rulemaking section sets forth detailed procedures through
which the rulemaking power must be exercised in order to comply with
procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing. 9 Notice
of the proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.30 In addition,
the basic procedural requirements for rulemaking under section
17A(b) provide that the commission shall 1) publish notice of the pro-
posed rule stating the reason for it; 2) allow an opportunity for written
comment; 3) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing; and 4)
promulgate the final rule based on the rulemaking record along with
a statement of basis and purpose.3 Tie section also sets out the speci-
fic procedures required for the informal hearings, including provisions
regarding such matters as cross-examination and rebuttal.32 Section
17A(d)(3) states that once the rule takes effect, a violation thereof
becomes an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of
section 5(a)(1).
33
C. Judicial Review of Rules
Section 17A also provides the manner and scope of judicial review
of the rulemaking process. Under its provisions any interested person,
including a consumer or consumer organization, may, within sixty days
after a rule is promulgated, file a petition in a United States court of
appeals for judicial review.34 The court has the option of remanding
the action to the commission for the submission of further evidence 35
shall not affect any authority of the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpre-
tive rules), and general statements of policy, with respect to unfair methods of compe-
tition in or affecting commerce." As can be seen, the section divides rulemaking into
two areas: rules with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and those with
respect to unfair methods of competition. The Improvements Act expressly excludes the
latter from consideration, leaving unaffected any F.T.C. rulemaking powers in the field
of unfair competition. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). The field of unfair
competition is beyond the scope of this note. The major piece of legislation concerning
the F.T.C.'s regulation of unfair competition is the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13,
14-21, 22-27 (1970). Rulemaking under this act is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
29. See text accompanying notes 31 and 32 infra.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975) requires that
when a rule is prescribed under this section, "the Commission shall proceed in accord-
ance with section 553 of Title 5 .... " the section governing rulemaking under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V, 1975).
35. Id.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
or invoking its jurisdiction to review the rule in accordance with section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.86
Under the latter section, the court of appeals may reverse a deci-
sion of the commission when it finds that the administrative deter-
mination was:
(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law;
(b) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immun-
ity;
(c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right; or
(d) without observance of procedure required by law.37
In addition to these specific grounds, the court may set aside the rule
if it finds that the action is not supported by substantial evidence in
the rulemaking record as a whole, or that the commission has precluded
discovery of material facts necessary for a fair determination under a
subsection (c) procedure.8 The section on judicial review concludes
with a statement vesting the exclusive power of review in the United
States courts of appeals.3 9
D. Civil Penalties
One significant section of the Improvements Act is section 5(m),
providing for civil penalties in the event of violation of the prescribed
rules or a commission cease and desist order. One of the major defici-
encies of the F.T.C.'s enforcement of the act before these amendments
lay in the F.T.C.'s inability to curtail acts or practices that it had
determined to be deceptive.40  Under the Improvements Act, the
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
37. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (Supp. V, 1975). This subsection prescribes the proce-
dures that must be strictly followed whenever the commission conducts informal hear-
ings.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
40. One famous example of this was the protracted F.T.C. battle against Carter
Products and its "little liver pills." In Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 268 F.2d 461
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), Carter Products was charged with violat-
ing section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for allegedly engaging in unfair and
deceptive acts or practices regarding its advertising claims for "Carter's Little Liver
Pills." The original complaint was filed in 1943. Numerous hearings were conducted
before the F.T.C. issued a cease and desist order against Carter Products. The case was
eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which remanded the case for
further hearings. In 1956, at the conclusion of approximately 149 hearings, the F.T.C.
issued a second cease and desist order against Carter Products. Carter Products again
appealed and in 1959, sixteen years after the initial complaint, the Ninth Circuit denied
the petition to set aside the order.
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commission may commence a civil action on its own behalf to recover
a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each violation of .a rule,
providing that the defendant acts with actual or implied knowledge that
such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.41
The Improvements Act also states that if a cease and desist order
becomes final respecting an act or practice that the commission has
found to be unfair or deceptive, the commission may commence a civil
action to recover a civil penalty of $10,000 per violation from anyone
who engages in such act or practice, provided that such person is
chargeable with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or
deceptive and is unlawful under section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.42 The Improvements Act further specifies that each
additional day of failure to comply with the rule or with section
5(a)(1) shall be treated as a separate violation, and that in fixing the
penalty, the court should take into consideration such things as the
degree of culpability, history of similar misconduct, ability to pay, the
effect on the ability to remain in business, and such other matters as
may be just.4"
An important section of the penalty provisions provides that if the
cease and desist order establishing that the act or practice is unfair or
deceptive was not issued against the particular defendant in the civil
penalty action, then "the issues of fact in such action against such
defendant shall be tried de novo."' " This allowance of a trial de novo
is significant because section 5(c) states that F.T.C. findings in a cease
and desist order shall be conclusive. The trial de novo provision is
designed to protect potential defendants. Some issues, such as whether
a particular act or practice falls within the proscribed conduct of the
cease and desist order, may already be determined in a civil penalty
action because of the conclusiveness provision. Each defendant's par-
ticular fact situation shall nevertheless be considered separately and
without regard to factual determinations against prior defendants.
Whether the defendant in fact committed the alleged act or practice
and whether the requisite standard of knowledge was present will merit
separate consideration.
The penalty provisions of the Improvements Act are both the most
controversial45 and the most important concerning the real power of the
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (A) (Supp. V, 1975).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (B) (Supp. V, 1975).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
45. See text accompanying notes 121-37 infra.
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F.T.C. Without meaningful penalties there is little to induce compli-
ance with the regulations. The policing of deceptive acts and practices
has been no exception.
E. Consumer Redress
In addition to the action for civil penalties against violators, the
Improvements Act provides for an action on behalf of consumers by
the F.T.C.46 Specifically, the Improvements Act provides that the
commission may commence a civil action for consumer redress against
any person, partnership, or corporation in a United States district court
or state court of competent jurisdiction if that party violates any rule
under the act." Similarly, if a party engages in any unfair or deceptive
act or practice with respect to which the commission has issued a final
cease and desist order against that particular party, and the commission
"satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist
order relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under
the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent," the commission may
bring a suit for redress.4"
The court is specifically given jurisdiction to grant redress in the
form of rescission or reformation of a contract, the refund of money
or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification
respecting the rule violation or unfair or deceptive practice. The
section expressly prohibits exemplary or punitive damages.
The Improvements Act also sets forth rules concerning the conclu-
siveness of the commission findings regarding violations of cease and
desist orders, 50 and follows with a provision regarding the notice that
is to be given to the injured parties. 51
F. Summary of Amendments
The Improvements Act expands the jurisdiction of the F.T.C. to
acts affecting commerce as well as those in commerce, provides express
46. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V, 1975).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
48. This is to be contrasted with the civil penalty provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)
(1) (A) (Supp. V, 1975), where cease and desist orders can be used against any person.
Section 57b(a) (2) requires the defendant to be the party named in the order.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(c)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). This section states that notice
should be given in a manner that is reasonably calculated to apprise the injured parties
of the pending action, and that such notice may be given by publication in the discretion
of the court.
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substantive rulemaking powers to the commission, and provides proce-
dural guidelines for establishing those rules. Additionally, the 1975
amendments provide meaningful civil penalties for knowing violations
of promulgated rules or final cease and desist orders-perhaps the most
significant new addition-greatly facilitating enforcement of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act. Another major benefit is the relief to
consumers provided by the consumer redress provision.
Although express rulemaking powers are not the only notable pro-
visions of the act, this note places emphasis on rulemaking because of
the uniqueness of those provisions in relation to the rest of the act.
Rulemaking is presently an important power of the commission because
it has survived a court testing.52 Additionally, rulemaking is important
because rules should be much more widely applicable than cease and
desist orders, which single out individual defendants, and because the
rulemaking procedures, as set out in section 17A, make rulemaking a
very inviting procedure from the standpoint of the F.T.C. Rulemaking
will quite likely comprise the bulk of future F.T.C. activity.5 3
MI. Constitutional Implications of the
Improvements Act
The legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ments Act reveals an intense concern for the establishment of adequate
52. See note 27 supra.
53. The rulemaking procedures in 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V, 1975) appear to be
superior to cease and desist order proceedings in almost every context in which they
might be utilized. They clearly broaden the scope of trade rules, permitting not only
"rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive," but
also rules "for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)
(1) (B) (Supp. V, 1975). This should allow for more comprehensive and widely appli-
cable enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act than is available through cease
and desist orders. Careful analysis of the rulemaking procedures in section 57a and the
cease and desist order provisions in section 45(b) and (c) reveals that the F.T.C. has
much more control over the informal hearing procedures of rulemaking. For example,
more stringent limitations are placed on the rights of cross-examination and rebuttal in
rulemaking hearings, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (Supp. V, 1975), while standards regarding
admissible evidence are more relaxed. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) .(Supp. V, 1975). Another
advantage is the knowledge requirement that accompanies rulemaking in suits for civil
penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (A) (Supp. V, 1975). The standard of knowledge re-
quired is less severe than the knowledge requirements necessary for civil penalty suits
arising from cease and desist orders. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975). Sim-
ilar advantages exist under section 57b, the consumer redress provision. The standards
for allowing redress are easier for rule violations and seem to have less ambiguous lan-
guage. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1975) with 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2)
(Supp. V, 1975). On the whole, the rulemaking provisions seem to avoid many of the
procedural complications and potential constitutional problems found in other sections
of the Improvements Act.
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procedural safeguards for those subject to the regulatory powers of the
F.T.C. The provisions regarding rulemaking,54 judicial review,5" and
notice5" were of primary concern. With the exception of rulemaking,
the constitutionality of the new provisions has yet to be tested. This
section will identify some of the areas that may generate due process
problems, and analyze these problems in light of the legislative history
and present case law.
A. Due Process Standards
Although properly within the scope of Congress' delegable
powers, 57 the Improvements Act may still be vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack for deprivation of procedural due process. Two doctrines,
however, serve as built-in safeguards for persons affected by this act.
First, all delegated powers must satisfy the due process provisions of
the Constitution. Morgan v. United States5 discusses the issue of pro-
cedural due process within administrative agencies and sets forth a
mandatory standard. In that case the Court declared:
[I]n administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudi-
mentary requirements of fair play. These demand "a fair and open
hearing,"-essential alike to the legal validity of the administrative
regulation and to the maintenance of public confidence in the value
and soundness of this important governmental process.
The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evi-
dence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument
implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren
one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in
a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities
are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes
54. H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1974). This report carefully
sets out the conference substitute that adds the new rulemaking section to the act and
lists the steps necessary for complete compliance with the rulemaking provision.
55. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 46 (1974). The report discusses
the necessity of judicial review provisions within the act to provide greater procedural
safeguards in view of the potentially pervasive effect of rules.
56. S. REp. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973).
57. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935), the Supreme
Court discussed the issue of congressional delegation and stated: "The Constitution has
never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and
establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subor-
dinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy
as declared by the Legislature is to apply."
58. 304 U.S. 1 (1937).
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and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final com-
mand.59
This fundamental requirement of fairness has been applied to all
administrative agency proceedings, whether in the nature of rulemak-
ing or adjudication. 60
Second, once an agency has established procedures for the protec-
tion of constitutional rights, the agency may not deviate from them
even if the procedures go beyond what is constitutionally required.
6
1
If a procedural error does occur and the defendant is prejudiced
as a result of that error, there has been a denial of due process and
the agency proceeding will not be allowed to stand.
62
B. Cease and Desist Orders
There are several different methods by which the F.T.C. may seek
to enforce section 5(a), which makes unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices unlawful. The first procedure that governs the issuance of cease
and desist orders against persons believed to be in violation of the act
is set forth in section 5(b) of the act. This subsection calls for the
giving of notice to any person believed to be violating section 5(a) and
requires a hearing in which the party is given an opportunity to show
cause why a cease and desist order should not be entered against him.
The F.T.C. is required to state its findings as to the facts, and if the
order is issued, the party has sixty days after the service of the order
to seek review in the appropriate United States court of appeals under
section 5(c).
The issuance of cease and desist orders is a long established
practice of the F.T.C. The only constitutional question that might be
generated by this section is the possible abridgment of the right to a
jury trial provided by the Seventh Amendment 3 and Federal Rule of
59. Id. at 14-15, 18-19.
60. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 12 (3d Cir. 1973). See
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968).
61. In Pacific Molasses v. F.T.C., 356 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1966), the court
of appeals stated: "When an administrative agency promulgates rules to govern its pro-
ceedings, these rules must be scrupulously observed [citation omitted]. This is so even
when the defined procedures are ... generous beyond the requirements that bind such
agency [citation omitted]."
62. Id. at 387.
63. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII. This right to a jury trial in civil actions
has never been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and is viewed
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Civil Procedure 38.64 Under subsection 5(b), the commission is made
the finder of fact at both the hearing level and at the review level in the
court of appeals, thereby precluding the determination of facts by a
jury. Settled case law establishes that an administrative agency hearing
does not abridge the Seventh Amendment and Rule 38 rights to a jury
trial, but constitutes an exception to the right. 5
While the issue of jury versus administrative fact finding does not
normally merit much attention, it is significant here because section
5(c) requires that the commission's findings be conclusive upon judicial
review. This conclusive factual determination at the agency level is
of great importance in view of sections 5(m)(1)(B) and 17B(a)(2),
which allow the imposition of potentially severe sanctions for the viola-
tion of a cease and desist order based on such findings.
The right to a jury trial became firmly established by the adoption
of the Seventh Amendment in 1791. Since that time, however, the
scope of the Seventh Amendment right in suits at common law has been
expanded beyond the common law forms of action recognized at the
time of its adoption, 68 and courts today routinely apply the Seventh
Amendment to causes of action based on statutes.6 7  The question
arises whether proceedings stemming from causes of action based upon
section 5(b) of the Improvements Act come under the definition of
as a somewhat less fundamental part of due process than other provisions in the Bill
of Rights.
64. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
65. See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
66. Mr. Justice Story in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830), founded
this principle: "The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contra-distinc-
tion to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence .... By common law, [the
framers of the Amendment] meant.., not merely suits, which the common law recog-
nized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contra-distinction to those where equitable rights alone
were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered .. ." Id. at 446-47. Many
years later in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Court blurred this distinction
between legal and equitable claims regarding the right to a jury trial and ultimately held
that "the Seventh Amendment question depends upon the nature of the issue to be tried
rather than the character of the overall action." Id. at 537-38.
67. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), where the Court dealt with
the issue of whether the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applied to a case
brought under a federal statute. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to a
jury trial under this cause of action because "legal" rights and remedies were at issue,
and noted that "although the Court has apparently never discussed the issue at any
length, we have often found the Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action
based on statutes." Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
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suits at common law under modem application of the Seventh Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 8
established a test for determining which statutory causes of action come
under the Seventh Amendment. In that case it was found that a jury
would substantially interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory
scheme. 69 The Court made the important distinction between actions
that invoke an administrative proceeding and those that do not, and
held that when there is a functional justification for not granting a jury
trial, it will not be required. 0 Jones & Laughlin Steel has been inter-
preted to stand for the proposition that "the Seventh Amendment is
generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials
would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative
adjudication.""1  A proceeding under section 5(b) is an action that
invokes an administrative procedure under the Jones & Laughlin Steel
standard. The proceeding is conducted entirely within the agency and
does not invoke the original jurisdiction of the federal court. Further-
more, the agency proceedings must be completed before the case can
reach the court of appeals on review. Numerous policy considera-
tions militate against intervention by a jury. These include the need for
consistency in the administration of agency procedure and the need for
uniformity regarding conduct that has been defined as unfair or
deceptive, as well as increasing recognition of the F.T.C.'s expertise."
Both the legislative history of the Improvements Act and case law show
that commission fact finding is required to satisfy the comprehensive
scheme of administrative adjudication under this act. It can be argued
that allowing jury trials would undermine the act's effectiveness
because of the need for uniform national policy for the fair administra-
tion of consumer protection law and for the guidance of the business
community. Some consistency is required to allow the development of
reasonable expectations regarding the legal standards set by the com-
mission. 73  This is extremely important when the expectations often
lead parties to consent to cease and desist orders. 4 Jury intervention
could substantially interfere with this important procedure because of
68. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
69. Id. at 48-49.
70. Id. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1116 nn.16 & 18 (7th Cir. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
71. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
72. See note 76 and text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1974).
74. See United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 689 n.13 (2d Cir.
1966).
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the very real possibility that the jury might disregard the commission's
interpretations of what constitutes a violation of section 5(a). The
consent procedure is a significant part of the enforcement scheme of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and could obviously be disrupted
by a jury determination of the facts in an administrative proceeding.
Commentators have suggested that there is congressional intent to
defer to agency expertise rather than jury determination of facts. As
Judge Oakes pointed out in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
J.B. Williams Co.: 75 "The case law on this 'expertise' is unequivocal
and so voluminous that it is necessary only to illuminate the point.
'76
The judicial interpretation of congressional intent is quite clear in pro-
moting the view that the commission, because of its expertise and ef-
fectiveness, should be the fact finder in administrative proceedings such
as cease and desist order hearings under section 5(b).
On appeal, a cease and desist order issued under section 5(b) is
reviewed by the United States court of appeals under section 5(c), and
the F.T.C.'s statement of facts is conclusive if supported by "evidence."
This st.ndard for review has been judicially interpreted to be synony-
mous with the "substantial evidence" standard for judicial review set
out in section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.77 According to
Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C.,78 F.T.C. decisions must "be supported
75. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
76. Id. at 445 (Oakes, I., dissenting). Judge Oakes quoted from the Supreme
Court's decision in F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965): "This
statutory scheme necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in interpreting sec-
tion 5 [15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V, 1975)] and in applying it to the facts of particular cases
arising out of unprecedented situations. Moreover, as an administrative agency which
deals continually with cases in the area, the Commission is often in a better position
than are the courts to determine whether a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning
of the Act." 498 F.2d 414, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1974). Likewise, in Holloway v. Bristol-
Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court stated: 'The enforcement
scheme embodied in the Federal Trade Commission Act, stresses the Commission's role
in providing certainty and specificity to the board [sic] proscriptions of the Act. The
FTC, as a quasi-judicial tribunal, has the ability to provide for the centralized and or-
derly development of precedent applying the regulatory statute to a diversity of fact situ-
ations. . . . The courts, on the other hand, have at their disposal only relatively rudi-
mentary devices to promote settlements. More important, they lack the expertise and
knowledge of business practices needed to evaluate whether any settlement by the parties
is in furtherance of the broad public interest that is the foundation of the Act." Id.
at 998.
77. Section 701 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that section 706 shall
apply to administrative agencies "except to the extent that-() statutes preclude judicial
review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Neither of
these two exceptions is relevant to the review of cease and desist orders. 5 U.S.C. §
701 (1970).
78. 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
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by substantial evidence 'on the record considered as a whole.' If, after
canvassing and fairly assessing the entire record, a reviewing court can-
not conscientiously find that the evidence supporting an agency decision
is substantial, 'good conscience' dictates that the agency decision
be reversed. '79 Because of this interpretation of "evidence" as mean-
ing the same thing as substantial evidence, the omission of the word
"substantial" from section 5(c) does not seem to be of any conse-
quence.
The cease and desist order provisions seem to present no other
significant constitutional problems. Personal service of process is
required by section 5(f) and the hearing itself, conducted under section
5(b), has long been an accepted procedure of the F.T.C. and comes
within the administrative procedure exception to the Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial. Judicial review may be had by right in the
court of appeals and through certiorari to the Supreme Court. These
procedures are designed to protect fully the constitutional rights of par-
ties to an action, and the F.T.C. may not deviate from them.
80
C. Rulemaking
The Improvements Act provides, for the first time in statutory
form, for the promulgation of rules that "define with specificity acts or
practices which are unfair or deceptive" as well as rules for the
"purpose of preventing such acts or practices."'81  Specific guide-
lines were delineated8 2 to insure that the "fundamental requirements
of fairness" mandated in all administrative proceedings83 would be met.
As stated in Morgan v. United States,"4 this includes the right to a fair
and open hearing with reasonable opportunity to be advised of agency
proposals and to present evidence regarding them.
While the rulemaking section does provide an opportunity for an
informal hearing 5 and the presentation of evidence88 after a rule is
proposed, strict limitations are placed on the extent to which an inter-
ested party may participate in a hearing.8 7 Section 17A also eases the
standard of evidence necessary to uphold a rule upon judicial review.
79. Id. at 493.
80. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V, 1975).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
83. See Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
84. 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1937).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1) and (2) (Supp. V, 1975).
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Subsection 17A(e) defines evidence as "any matter in the rulemaking
record." Subsections 17A(c) and (e) help insulate rules from chal-
lenge and invalidation."8 It is therefore questionable whether these
provisions comply with the spirit of due process expressed in Morgan.
They do, however, appear to satisfy the requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.'
An analysis of section 17A's guidelines reveals no notice problem.
In addition to publishing notice of proposed rules in the Federal Regis-
ter, the practice of the commission is to issue additional news releases
regarding proposed rules and to send a weekly capsule of F.T.C. news
to any interested party who requests to be on the mailing list. As to
the determination of facts regarding the promulgation of a rule, section
17A(c) requires informal hearings, subsection (e) provides for judicial
review of any rule, and subsection (h) allows for compensation for
reasonable attorney's fees and expert witness fees and other costs of
participation to any person who represents an interest that is not other-
wise adequately represented and cannot afford to pay the costs for par-
ticipation in such a proceeding.9° The substantial evidence rule9 '
applies to the commission's findings here. Consequently, the court will
set aside findings only if they are not supported by substantial evidence
or if there has been a violation of the rulemaking procedure92 that in-
corporates relevant sections of the Administrative Procedure Act.
9 3
D. Civil Penalties
1. Violation of a Rule
A major method by which the F.T.C. enforces compliance with
the Federal Trade Commission Act is provided in the Improvements
Act under section 5(m)(1)(A). This section allows the F.T.C. to
bring a civil action in district court to recover a penalty for the violation
of any rule under the act. While the substantive power granted by
this section is not new,94 the procedural power is. As amended, this
section provides for the prosecution of a rule violation before issuance
of a cease and desist order. Dropping the prerequisite cease and desist
88. See note 53 supra.
89. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556(d) (1970).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(c), (e) and (h) (Supp. V, 1975).
91. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (3) (Supp. V, 1975). See text accompanying notes 29-33
supra.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
94. See note 27 supra.
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order eliminates one of the procedural steps required in National
Petroleum.5 The question then arises whether this procedural short
cut in any way violates due process requirements.
Section 5(m)(1)(A) allows an action only when a person
violates the rule "with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied
on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or decep-
tive and is prohibited by such rule." The Improvements Act requires
publication of all rules, 6 and the actual practices of the F.T.C. gener-
ate even more widespread publication than is procedurally required.
Therefore, notice of any new rule is widely disseminated and easily
acquired by those concerned in the business community. Obviously,
there is no denial of due process if the party has actual notice of
the rule and knowledge that the act in question violates such rule. It
appears clear that this meets the standards set out in Morgan v. United
States,9 7 and that the party is "fairly advised" of what the F.T.C. has
proposed to be an illegal act or practice.
The implied knowledge standard also does not seem to infringe
on due process rights. Congress has indicated a general standard for
determining whether knowledge is to be fairly implied. "[lit is in-
tended that the courts hold a defendant responsible where a reason-
able and prudent man under the circumstances would have known of
the existence of the rule and that the act or practice was in violation
of its provisions."""
While a violator of a rule in most cases could be charged with
"knowledge fairly implied from objective circumstances" based on
notice through publication, the party against whom the action was
brought will in all cases have the opportunity to "show why he should
not have been expected to have knowledge of the Commission rule or
that the rule itself is invalid." 9  Given the mandatory notice require-
ments of the Improvements Act'10 and the efforts of the F.T.C. to pub-
licize the rules as much as possible, due process appears to have been
provided.
95. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 US. 951 (1974).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
97. 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1937).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974). See Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). "Just as everyone is charged with knowledge
of the U.S. Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and
regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents. 49 Stat. 502,
44 U.S.C. § 307." Id. at 380, 384-85.
99. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1973).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
Another area of potential dispute under this procedure is the issue
of fact finding and the right to a jury trial. This issue comes up again
because, unlike section 5(b) cease and desist order hearings, which are
exempt from jury trials, section 5(m)(l)(A) actions are not adminis-
trative and are within the original jurisdiction of the federal district
court.
Despite the fact that the right to a jury trial appears to be well
settled,1 " the statutory scheme of the Federal Trade Commission Act
suggests that there may still be room for dispute. One argument that
appears to be valid is that the right to a jury trial would "subvert the
entire statutory structure"'1 2 of the F.T.C. It has been asserted that
the major function of the F.T.C. is deciding what is and is not
deceptive. 0 3  It has also been emphasized that the F.T.C.'s civil
penalty section is not "an isolated 'civil action' provision but rather is
a provision conceived with and embedded in a complex statutory
scheme that is the very foundation of an administrative agency's
power.'
'10 4
The language of section 17A(a), which authorizes the commission
to define with specificity acts or practices that are deceptive, raises
some as yet unanswered questions. Such issues arise about whether this
provision not only extends to the promulgation of valid rules, but
can be used as well to determine under what factual situations the
rules have been violated. Similarly, it can be questioned whether the
emphasis in many earlier cases regarding the F.T.C.'s expertise on fact
finding extends to this provision, and whether the previous dicta regard-
ing the weight that should be given to F.T.C. expertise provides
adequate justification in the Jones & Laughlin Steel'1 5 sense, so that a
proceeding under section 5(m)(l)(A) is not really a suit in the nature
of an ordinary civil proceeding. The court in United States v. St. Regis
Paper Co.'0 6 stated that "the Commission alone knows the scope of its
orders."' 0 7  The court there clearly acknowledged the expertise of the
F.T.C. in interpreting its own cease and desist orders. It could also
101. See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
102. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 440 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes,
J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 440-41.
104. Id. at 451.
105. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See text accom-
panying notes 68-72 supra.
106. 355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. Id. at 696.
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be argued that only the F.T.C. knows the scope of its rules and there-
fore ought to be allowed to use its expertise to interpret them.
108
United States v. J.B. Williams Co.'°9 dealt directly with the issue
of the right to a jury trial in an action brought by the F.T.C. in a dis-
trict court."' The majority opinion in Williams determined that the
defendant in the civil action was entitled to the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. Williams
was decided in 1974, prior to passage of the Improvements Act, but
its applicability to F.T.C. federal court proceedings remains clear, since
the Improvements Act has not changed the nature of court proceedings
except to allow the commission to bring suits on its own behalf, rather
than having to go through the Attorney General's office as previously
required under the Federal Trade Commission Act."'
Since Williams, the right to a jury trial in a district court action
brought by the F.T.C. has been well established."' This right is based
upon three grounds discussed in Williams. First, proceedings under
section 5(m) of the Improvements Act (which are the equivalent of
the pre-amendment section 5(l) suit in Williams) are ordinary ones
in the nature of suits at common law; second, there is no functional
justification for the denial of a jury trial as in Jones & Laughlin Steel;
and third, since there has been no prior agency proceeding regarding
the recovery penalties, a jury trial cannot be denied.
Three criteria for finding a proceeding to be an ordinary civil suit
were stated in Rogers v. Loether:"3s
108. See note 76 supra.
109. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. In Williams, the F.T.C. originally filed a complaint against Williams alleging
false representations in the advertising of Geritol. A cease and desist order was issued.
After several years the F.T.C. ordered a hearing to determine whether Williams' new
commercials complied with the order. Concluding that they did not, the commission
brought an action in district court to recover civil penalties. The district court judge
granted summary judgment for the United States and Williams appealed. The United
States court of appeals reversed, finding the defendants were entitled to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment in the district court proceeding. This holding should be equally
applicable to civil penalty actions for violations of rules because it is based upon issues
of fact heard in the district court for the first time, rather than upon any distinctions
between rules and orders.
111. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. V, 1975).
112. Spokespersons for the F.T.C. have declared that defendants have a right to a
jury trial on all disputed issues of fact relating to whether the practices in question vio-
late the act. E. Rubin, Enforcement of FTC Orders and Rules: A Staff Perspective,
in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN 1975, at 132 (1975).
113. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), afrd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974). The action in Rogers v. Loether was brought for an alleged violation of the
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First... ;[t]he proceeding is judicial in character rather than ad-
ministrative or "statutory. .. ." Second, the remedy sought...
is the relief most typical of an action at law.... Finally, the nature
of the substantive right asserted, although not specifically recog-
nized at common law, is analogous to common law rights.1
4
This quotation is an accurate description of F.T.C. proceedings under
section 5(m), as well as the action in Williams. In civil penalty
suits the proceeding is judicial in character, the relief sought is dam-
ages, and the substantive right asserted is analogous to common law
rights.
115
The second argument in Williams which supports the right to a
jury trial in district court penalty actions is the claim that a jury would
not substantially interfere with the role of this particular agency pro-
ceeding in the statutory scheme of the Federal Trade Commission
Act."1 6 A jury trial in civil penalty suits would not deny the commis-
sion its major function of defining unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, but would only permit the jury to determine disputed
issues of fact as to whether there was a violation of a valid order or
rule.' 7 The majority in Williams stated further that the statutory
scheme will not be upset because there is no congressional mandate
in the Federal Trade Commission Act that requires "deference to the
agency's claim that its order has been violated"" 8 when the issue of
a violation of the order or rule is between the agency and the judiciary.
The third argument for the right to a jury trial under section
5(m)(1)(A) proceedings to recover penalties for a rule violation is
that there has been no prior administrative hearing, and the defendant
is being heard for the first time in district court to determine whether
a statute has been violated. The dissenting opinion in Williams distin-
guished between agency actions that had prior administrative proceed-
ings and those that did not." 9 The dissent asserted that a jury was
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The court held that although the action was statutorily based,
it was a judicial proceeding in the nature of an ordinary civil suit and not a statutory
proceeding. 467 F.2d at 1117.
114. Id. at 1116-17.
115. Additional support for the position that the suit in Williams is an ordinary civil
suit is found in the Supreme Court's decision in Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363
(1974), which held that "ordinary civil actions" require a jury trial on demand and that
"section 5(l) of the FTC Act provides just such a 'civil action."' Id. at 383.
116. 498 F.2d 414, 424 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. Id. at 426.
118. Id. at 429 [citation omitted].
119. Id. at 451 (Oakes, J., dissenting). The action in Williams was brought under
15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. V, 1975) and the defendant was subject to a cease and
desist order and therefore to a prior administrative proceeding.
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inappropriate in the Williams case because the defendant had partici-
pated in a prior administrative proceeding. This argument clearly does
not apply to section 5(m)(1)(A) suits that enjoy the original jurisdic-
tion of the district court and have no prior agency hearings regarding
the conduct of the defendant.
In spite of questions regarding the scope of the commission's func-
tion in prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices and the weight that
should be given the commission's expertise, these issues will probably
not create problems in light of the commission's prevailing attitude
regarding the right to jury trials.1 2
2. Violation of a Cease and Desist Order
Improvements Act section 5(m)(l)(B) provides an apparently
novel procedure for enforcing the prohibition against unfair or de-
ceptive practices. It provides for a civil suit in district court to
recover a penalty against any person who violates a final cease and
desist order, whether that person was named in the order or not.
Actual knowledge that the act or practice is unlawful under section
5(a)(1) is required, however. If the cease and desist order was not
issued against the defendant in the civil action, subsection 5(c)(2) pro-
vides that issues of fact shall be tried de novo. This section, in effect,
gives the commission additional power to promulgate substantive rules
of general force and effect. Through the issuance of a cease and
desist order it is possible for the commission to control the conduct of
an entire industry or area if the requisite knowledge is present. This
section is valuable to the commission because it increases its effective-
ness by eliminating the previously necessary step of issuing cease and
desist orders against each particular defendant before a cause of action
is created for which the commission can recover a civil penalty.
This section of the Improvements Act is probably the most vulner-
able of all to constitutional attack for violation of due process. Several
constitutional problems inhere in this provision respecting the right of
a party to be heard. The potential problems focus upon the commis-
sion's practices regarding intervention, consent orders, and de novo
hearings. It is likely that under this section not all parties will be
afforded a full opportunity to be heard.
It is possible that the F.T.C. might issue cease and desist orders
against small businesses, such as "Mom and Pop" stores, which have
limited ability and funds for effectively participating in commission
120. See note 112 supra.
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hearings, and then, under section 5(m)(1)(B), apply these orders
against big businesses-which would probably not be allowed to inter-
vene in the original proceeding wherein the cease and desist order was
issued. Although intervention is allowed under section 5(b), it is dis-
cretionary with the F.T.C.121
The constitutionality of this section must be examined in light of
the protections that the concept of due process affords to all per-
sons. 12 2 The principal guideline is that the party involved in an action
under section 5(m)(1)(B) must be afforded the right of adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Naturally, when the defendant
is the named party in a cease and desist order, these requirements are
satisfied by the defendant's participation in the original proceeding
resulting in the order. 123  For those not a party to the original order,
notice should not be a problem because section 5(m)(1)(B)(2) re-
quires nothing less than actual knowledge that the practice is unlawful.
This conclusion is supported by the contrasting language of "actual
knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective cir-
cumstances" 24 that is required in a suit for the violation of a rule.
While cease and desist orders, especially against small businesses,
might not receive much publicity, the requirement that a party have ac-
tual knowledge that the act is unfair or deceptive and is considered
unlawful under section 5(a) would satisfy due process protections re-
lating to notice. The precise language of this section provides an ade-
quate guarantee.
25
The requirement of a hearing, section 5(m)(2), mandates that
"the issues of fact in such action against such defendant shall be tried
de novo" in district court. This section provides the defendant with
an opportunity to be heard. A trial under section 5(m)(2) would be
essentially the same as one under section 5(m)(1)(A), 20 with no pre-
121. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V, 1975) states: "Any person, partnership, or cor-
poration may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the
Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person."
122. See Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). "The fundamental
requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceed-
ings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is in-
voked. .... Statutory proceedings affecting property rights, which, by later resort to
the courts, secure to adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suitable to the occasion,
do not deny due process." Id. at 246-47.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
126. See text accompanying notes 110-18 supra.
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vious agency proceeding against the defendant. Therefore, the right
to a jury trial should be the same.
This right to a trial de novo on issues of fact encompasses only
the issue of whether the defendant's acts did or did not violate the pro-
visions of the order, and does not involve the issue of whether the act in
the original cease and desist order is in actuality one that is unfair or de-
ceptive. The validity of the original order is not in question in a section
5(m)(1)(B) proceeding. 1 7  That issue is res judicata and should pre-
clude a defendant from attacking the validity of conclusions of law
made in a prior cease and desist order proceeding against other defend-
ants. It could also deny a defendant a full trial in a situation where
he may seek to argue that the "prior order proceeding establishe[d] only
prima facie illegality of conduct which may not be unlawful in his par-
ticular circumstances.' 12  This is a potentially serious problem since
intervention by interested parties in cease and desist order hearings is
merely discretionary.
Although any dispute regarding the unlawfulness of the act or
practice should already have been settled in an agency hearing as pro-
vided in section 5(b), where the party served with a cease and desist
order had the opportunity to show cause why it is not unlawful, in many
cases this very issue of validity has not been argued at all. In most in-
stances, before a complaint is issued under section 5(b), "the party
involved is given an opportunity to consent to a formal cease and desist
order."' 29 While the consent order refers only to future practices, 30
proposed regulations of the F.T.C. provide:
Every agreement shall contain, in addition to an appropriate order,
either an admission of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law submitted simultaneously by the Commission's staff or an
admission of all jurisdictional facts and an express waiver of the
requirement that the Commission's decision contain a statement
of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In addition, every
agreement shall contain waivers of rights to seek judicial review
or otherwise to challenge or contest the validity of the order.' 31
This procedure allows for the establishment of an act or practice as
unlawful without any adjudicated findings of fact or conclusions of law
that it is unlawful. Uncertainty remains about whether such a cease and
desist order derived by consent may then be applied against other par-
127. J. Rill, Civil Penalties Under Section 5(m) of The Federal Trade Commission
Act, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN 1975, at 151 (1975).
128. Id.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974).
130. Id.
131. 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1976).
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ties in a suit for civil penalties or redress. While the F.T.C. has indi-
cated that this practice would not be permitted, 132 the statute is silent
on the issue.
The potential constitutional problem could be significant because
of the large percentage of defendants who consent during an agency
action. F.T.C. statistics show that approximately two-thirds to three-
quarters of the complaints issued by the commission result in consent
orders. 133  These figures reveal that if the F.T.C. does issue a cease
and desist order against smaller businesses the possibility that they will
consent to the order is great, especially because of their limited
resources to fight. However, large businesses are also encouraged to
consent. Though they may have greater resources, large firms very
often decline to spend the time and money in view of the adverse pub-
licity that often accompanies an agency proceeding to determine the
validity of a cease and desist order. Congressional discussion prior to
the enactment of the Improvements Act recognized both this problem
and the potential for finding an act or practice unlawful without having
a determination of facts regarding the practice.
134
The consent order process differs from an adjudication in that
the guarantee of a comprehensive consideration of fact publicly
adduced, evaluated, and relied upon in fashioning relief may be
lacking. For instance if a major corporation with a large, nation-
wide share -of a market were sued for violation of the provisions
of a consent order entered against a much smaller regional estab-
lishment, it might be argued that the respondent agreed to consent
merely to avoid the time, money and effort involved in adjudica-
tion, and not because of legal culpability. Under these circum-
stances it could be effectively argued that the Commission had
engaged in no less than rulemaking through the consent order pro-
cess and, thus, circumvented the required public notice and partici-
pation.' 3
5
While the problem was recognized, neither the Improvements Act
nor the legislative history seems to provide a means for preventing it
from occurring. Once recognized, the implications of the problem
appear to have been ignored. It has even been suggested that consent
orders are no different from other commission orders and that all final
orders are immune from collateral attack. 38 Although section 17B
132. See E. Rubin, Enforcement of FTC Orders and Rules: A Staff Perspective,
in THE FEDmL TRADE COMMaSSiON IN 1975, at 135 (1975).
133. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974); F.T.C. ANN. REP. 31-
32 (1964).
134. See H.R. RPEP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62-64 (1974).
135. Id. at 63.
136. Id. at 62-63,
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seems to make a distinction between final orders that have been subject
to judicial review and those that have not (including consents to cease
and desist orders),1 T no attempt was made in section 5(m)(1)(B)(1)
to distinguish final orders in any way or to determine whether they have
become final after a full hearing or by consent. This lack of distinc-
tion lends support to the view that all final orders might receive the
same treatment and have the same force and effect under section
5(m)(1)(B). It seems quite likely that the constitutionality of this pro-
vision will be challenged if final consent orders are used in such a
manner.
Section 5(m)(1)(B) will have serious impact on the commission.
It will almost certainly encourage intervention by interested parties and
discourage consents to orders issued under section 5(b). 8 Given the
long duration of F.T.C. proceedings and the consequently small
number of cases which the commission has the ability to litigate,'39 this
procedure could easily create a workload beyond the commission's
capacity.
E. Consumer Redress
Another method the F.T.C. may use to enforce section 5(a)
is found in the new and powerful consumer redress provision, sec-
tion 17B of the Improvements Act. This section gives the F.T.C. great
flexibility. It allows the commission to bring a civil suit for damages
in federal district court or any competent state court against any party
who either violates any rule issued under this act or violates the
terms of a final cease and desist order that was issued against
him under section 5(b) of the act. Section 17B(b) provides for
such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injuries to con-
sumers resulting from the violation. This section does not, however,
authorize exemplary or punitive damages.
The consumer redress section is a unique provision in that it is
the only section of the act that provides an immediate benefit to the
consumer for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act. How-
137. See text accompanying notes 140-42 infra.
138. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974).
139. See F.T.C. ANN. REP. 39-61 (1966). "In fiscal 1966, the General Counsel,
through the Division of Appeals, handled 112 cases. Litigation was completed in 46
of these, of which 20 were restraint of trade matters; 12 involved deceptive business
practices; 1 concerned the Commission's subpoena powers; and 13 were extraordinary
matters such as suits against the Commission for declaratory judgment or injunction."
Id. at 40.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ever, the application of this provision may run into difficulties resulting
from the use of ambiguous language. Subsection 17B(a)(2) refers to
acts that a "reasonable man would have known under the circumstances
[were] dishonest or fraudulent . . ." This is the only provision
in the Improvements Act in which the phrase "dishonest or fraudulent"
appears, and the exact meaning of these terms is unknown at this time.
It seems quite likely that this language will raise the F.T.C.'s burden
of proof somewhat above the unfair or deceptive behavior standard
used throughout the rest of the act. It is also unclear how much weight
should be given the reasonableness phrase in determining whether the
right to a jury should be required in this context.
An action for consumer redress may- arise in two different situa-
tions. One is through section 17B(a)(1), after the defendant violates
a rule. Due process is afforded the defendant here through a civil suit
in either a district or competent state court.
140
A section 17B suit may also arise under section 17B(a)(2) when
the defendant violates the terms of a final cease and desist order issued
specifically against him. Relief may be granted if "the Commission
satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist
order relates is one which a reasonable man would have known under
the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent ... .,141 The reason-
able man standard incorporated here seems to indicate that the defend-
ant would be entitled to a jury to apply this reasonableness test. How-
ever, subsection (c)(1) requires that if an order becomes final "then
the findings of the Commission as to the material facts in the proceed-
ing under 45 (b) [5 (b)] . . . shall be conclusive unless . . . the order
became final by reason of section 45(g) (1) [5(g) (1)] . . . ." It can
be argued that orders which become final under section 5(g)(1)1
42
include consent orders. The act does not specifically mention any
method by which consent orders become final. Since they become
final without a petition for review having been filed,1 43 it seems logi-
cal that section 5(g)(1) should apply here.
The last sentence of section 17B(c)(1) provides, however, that
commission findings will be conclusive if supported by evidence, if the
140. The applicability of the right to a jury trial has been discussed previously. See
text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1) (1970) reads: "Upon expiration of the time allowed
for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time
." a cease and desist order shall become final.
143. 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1976). See text accompanying note 131 supra.
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order becomes final as a result of section 5(g)(1). Arguably, this pro-
vision applies to consent orders and therefore circumvents some of the
due process problems that arose under section 5(m)(1)(B) in relation
to consent orders.14 4  The phrase "conclusive if supported by evidence"
brings into play the substantial evidence rule, which is the proper stand-
ard for evaluating evidence on review and will satisfy due process
requirements.1
45
The apparent rationale for this exception to the conclusiveness of
findings resulting from F.T.C. orders, which become final under section
5(g)(1), seems to be the hope that if the findings are rebuttable, par-
ties will continue to consent to orders and will refrain from constantly
seeking judicial review.'14  "It is not ithe intent . . . to encourage
respondents to resist the finalization of cease-and-desist orders because
of fear of the effects of an FTC order in a possible consumer redress
action under section 203 [section 17B]." :'4
One safeguard for a defendant against whom an order has become
final under section 5(g)(1), and who is now subject to a consumer
redress suit, is found in section 5(b). This section states:
[T]he Commission may at any time, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, reopen and alter, modify or set aside ... any report
or order made or issued by it under this section, whenever in the
opinion of the Commission conditions of fact or of law have so
changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so
require .... 148
Sections 17B(c)(1) and 5(b) seem to provide adequate oppor-
tunity to be heard in consumer redress suits, even if the party pre-
viously consented to the cease and desist order. However, there may
be some question regarding the requirement of notice. Notice to the
defendant is, of course, necessary to satisfy due process. The Improve-
ments Act provides for mandatory notice to consumers as well. Section
17B(c)(2) states:
The court shall cause notice of an action under this section to be
given in a manner which is reasonably calculated, under all of the
circumstances, to apprise the persons, partnerships, and corpora-
tions allegedly injured by the defendant's rule violation or act or
practice of the pendency of such action. Such notice may, in the
discretion of the court, be given by publication.'
49
144. See text accompanying notes 129-35 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
146. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).
147. Id.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
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While notice is mandatory, notice by publication is permissible.
Only in recent years has the power of a court to give notice through
publication become an issue. The Supreme Court decision in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin' established a new procedural due process
standard for notice, and the question arises whether the Eisen decision
extends beyond the class action situation. The legislative history of the
Improvements Act makes this question particularly relevant to section
17B. 151  It was suggested there that although an action under section
17B is "not a class action, it may be useful for the court to be guided
by some of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23."152
In Eisen, the Supreme Court determined that to comply with rule
23 individual notice must be provided to all class members identifiable
through reasonable effort. This decision was based upon the "express
language" of the rule and congressional intent as found in the advisory
committee's note to rule 23.1 11 Quite significantly, in cases where the
Court has required individual notice to class members," 4 the decision
has not rested upon the due process clause.'55  The Court's concern
in Eisen with the advisory committee's note indicates that it is not due
process, but the rule itself, that requires individual notice in all circum-
stances. There is a strong argument that the individual notice required
in class action suits flows not from the Constitution, but rather from rule
23.
It is significant that the basic reason for the notice requirement
of rule 23(c)(2) is not present in section 17B. The rationale for the
150. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
151. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973).
152. Id. Rule 23 in relevant part states that "the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual no-
tice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c) (2).
153. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39
F.R.D. 69 (1966). The Supreme Court's decision that individual notice is mandatory
under Rule 23(c) (2) has raised considerable debate concerning the accuracy of the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the advisory committee's intent, and more importantly,
whether the decision announces a constitutional standard. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1024 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), vacated, 417 U.S.
156 (1974); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities h
Procedure and Substance--Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1351 (1974) [herein-
after cited as McCall].
154. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
155. McCall, supra note 153, at 1408. See 38 J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.55
(2d ed. 1969).
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class action notice requirement is that members of a class are bound
by the judgment unless they have requested'exclusion. 156  However,
with respect to the Improvements Act, the House conference report
reaches the conclusion that there should be no bar to an action by a
consumer after a commission consumer redress action.'
57
The most persuasive reason for not requiring mandatory notice
under rule 23(c)(2) is simply that an action under section 17B is not
a class action, although its purpose and ultimate effect may be similar.
While the consumer redress section of the Improvements Act is obvi-
ously patterned after the class action model, the legislative history of
the act and judicial interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act have made it clear that the act does not allow for a private right
of action.' 5"
While the notice requirements for class action suits have been
drastically altered by the Eisen decision, there is no indication that the
requirements should apply to the Improvements Act, and, therefore,
the discretionary power of the court to allow notice by publication in
section 17B should be constitutionally permissible.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
157. H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). "It is not the intention of
the conferees that private actions for redress based on the acts or practices which are
the subject of a Commission consumer redress action be barred by a Commission action.
In any such case the defendant in the private action would be able to assert a defense
of payment or similar defenses. Failure of a consumer to appear or accept settlement
would therefore not affect private rights. Nor would an action under these consumer
redress provisions prevent the FTC from bringing an action under section 5(m) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act for a civil penalty. Similarly, actions by the Commis-
sion under section 5(m) of the Act would not affect the Commission's authority to
seek consumer redress nor the court's authority to grant such redress under this
section." Id. at 41. While the commission seems to be entitled to bring two
actions against the same defendant for the same act, this is not really double
recovery because the act is the basis for two separate causes of action--one to
penalize the defendant for the violation and the other to compensate the consumer in
some way for the unfair practice to which the consumer was subjected.
158. According to one of the sponsors of the bill: "There is no right of any con-
sumer to form a class and bring an action under this bill. . . . The Commission itself,
the FTC, may bring an action but it is not a class action. . . . Where the consumers
themselves get together and form a class and bring a suit-that is what you talk about
in a class action. This is something entirely different." 117 CoNG. REc. 39,849 (daily
ed. Nov. 8, 1971) (remarks of Senator Moss). The court in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), determined that consumers or members of the
public had no standing to enforce section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The court found no basis whatsoever for a private right of action either to enforce sec-
tion 5(a) or to seek damages for a violation of the act. 485 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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Conclusion
With the enactment of the 1975 Improvements Act, the Federal
Trade Commission has finally been empowered to protect consumers
and competitors from unfair' or deceptive acts or practices. Its rule-
making provisions give the F.T.C. a flexible alternative to issuance of
cease and desist orders and promise a fairer and more efficient altern-
ative to adjudication through promulgation of comprehensive guide-
lines covering significant areas of industry.
The civil penalty and consumer redress provisions of the 1975 act
lend significant credibility to the F.T.C.'s efforts to prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts by strengthening sanctions against such acts and by pro-
viding consumers injured by such acts relief through the federal
courts.
1 5 9
While the drafters of the Improvements Act have set out well
defined and significant powers for more effective enforcement of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the new provisions have not yet been
subjected to a court test of their constitutionality. Until the Improve-
ments Act has been interpreted by the federal courts, its scope
and impact will be somewhat uncertain. On the whole, it appears that
the act has been drafted with due process considerations well in mind,
but there are some inherent constitutional questions remaining. In par-
ticular, the provisions regarding civil penalties and consumer redress
following the issuance of a cease and desist order seem most vulnerable
to constitutional attack. However, regardless of the probability of
future judicial interpretation regarding the scope of the Improvements
Act, it seems likely that the act will have an immediate, significant
impact. There are indications the commission intends to be quite
ambitious in its enforcement and will focus upon violations having signi-
ficant impact on consumers and causing substantial economic injury.16
The Improvements Act seems to provide at last the necessary proce-
dural ammunition to facilitate this goal and to make the deterrence of
unlawful practices a realistic expectation.
159. This is significant in view of the fact that class actions have been virtually
eliminated as a means by which consumers can obtain relief in federal court for small
losses. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
160. See Tim FEB.RALTDE COMMiSSio IN 1975, at 123, 198, 199 (1975).
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